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CONTENTS

13 APRIL 1988

CHINA

Journal Views U.S. Long-Term Defense Strategy Report [Cui Liru; Beijing LIAOWANG, 7 Mar 88]	1
Acting Premier Li Peng Supports UN Peace, Disarmament Efforts [Beijing XINHUA, 30 Mar 88]	2
Envoy to Geneva CD Urges Worldwide Ban on Chemical Weapons [Beijing XINHUA, 31 Mar 88]	2

EAST EUROPE

CZECHOSLOVAKIA

German, CSSR Parties Urge Tripartite CW Talks [Prague CTK, 5 Apr 88]	4
----------------------------------------------------------------------	---

GERMAN DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC

NEUES DEUTSCHLAND Commentary on Warsaw Pact Appeal to NATO [East Berlin ADN International Service, 2 Apr 88]	4
Text of German, CSSR Parties' Statement on CW [East Berlin ADN International Service, 5 Apr 88]	4

HUNGARY

CSCE Envoy on Conventional Stability Mandate Progress in Vienna [Andre Erdos; Budapest Domestic Service, 31 Mar 88]	5
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------	---

SOVIET UNION

IZVESTIYA Profiles New ACDA Director Burns [Moscow IZVESTIYA, 27 Mar 88]	7
Warsaw Pact Foreign Ministers Committee Meets 29-30 March	7
Text of Communique [Moscow PRAVDA, 31 Mar 88]	7
'Appeal' to NATO, CSCE Countries [Moscow PRAVDA, 31 Mar 88]	10

WEST EUROPE

FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF GERMANY

Gorbachev Said To Favor 'Dominance of Defense' Proposal by Scientists [Kurt Kister; Munich SUEDDEUTSCHE ZEITUNG, 5 Feb 88]	12
-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------	----

Journal Views U.S. Long-Term Defense Strategy Report

*HK250857 Beijing LIAOWANG in Chinese
No 10, 7 Mar 88 pp 39-40*

[Article by Cui Liru: "Evaluating 'Distinguishing Deterrence,' a Research Report by the U.S. 'Committee on Long-Term General Strategy'"]

[Excerpts] The "Long-term General Strategy Committee" recently put forth its research report entitled "Distinguishing Deterrence," which reflected the tendency of a "revolution in strategic thinking" appearing in the United States in the 1980's, and the report is now being discussed by the parties concerned.

The "Long-term General Strategy Committee" was organized in October 1986, by then Secretary of Defense Weinberger and National Security Adviser Poindexter. It consists of 13 eminent members, including former National Security Advisers Kissinger, Brzezinski, and Clark, former Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Vessey, former commandant of the military academy Goodpastor, former Secretary of the Navy Claytor, former director of the Operations Department of the Navy Holloway, President of Rockefeller University Leideberg, and famous professor of political science Huntington. The co-chairmen of the committee are the current Undersecretary of Defense Ikle and famous strategist (?Wohlfetter).

According to the report, the slow economic growth or stagnation will widen the gap between the Soviet Union and the West, further weaken the competitive power of the Soviet Union, and make it more difficult to bear the burden of arms expansion. However, the Soviet Union will maintain its position as a superpower, and will rely more on military strength. This means that the arms race will continue, and will be especially focused on the high-technology field and outer space. Therefore, the report stresses that the United States must be more prudent and careful in arms control and disarmament negotiations with the Soviet Union, and should not sign any agreement that may restrain the United States from enhancing its military technology and weapons quality. This opinion obviously shows that the military and the hardliners in the United States cherish deep misgivings about Soviet disarmament proposals.

Of more realistic significance were the proposals on the military strategy of the United States over the next 20 years. The report clearly pointed out that the United States should deploy more forces in the regions and areas which may pose threats to the security interests of the United States. In past decades, the United States has always focused its main military and defense strategy on dealing with a Soviet attack against Europe and possible consequent direct full-scale military conflict between the United States and the Soviet Union. In fact, the actual possibility of such a conflict is becoming less and less. In the future, threats will mainly come from conflicts in the

Third World, and the possible expansion of Soviet influence through such conflicts. Therefore, U.S. strategy should give priority to its ability to fight "low-intensity wars" in Third World regions. This requires that the United States strengthen its fast-reaction and task forces, and continue to build up its naval forces and make them more mobile and flexible.

In fact, this opinion has been demonstrated in the current military strategy of the Reagan administration.

The original proposal in the report was to stress that the United States should develop the latest technology to make highly accurate long-range missiles that are able to carry small nuclear warheads or conventional warheads. These can be used to strike specific targets in the manner of a "surgical operation." Thus, the United States will have the ability to fight a limited war in a flexible way. This is the core of "distinguishing deterrence" put forth by the report. By possessing such "nimble" weapons, the United States will be able to interfere directly in regional conflicts if necessary, and can also prevent itself from being directly involved in conflicts. In particular, the overseas military bases of the United States are facing more and more difficulties, and this strategy provides an effective way to reduce dependence on the overseas bases and on the use of other countries' airspace.

Moreover, the new proposal includes another important implication. Since the 1960's, the United States has been pursuing a so-called flexible reaction strategy on the basis of nuclear deterrence in Europe. On 20 January, this year, the national security strategy report submitted by the Reagan administration to Congress briefly explained the flexible reaction strategy. The West can have three reaction options to deal with a potential aggressor:

—Direct defense: To check aggression without escalating the conflict;

—Escalation threat: To let the would-be aggressor know that they may pay a much higher cost than they expect or that they can bear;

—Retaliation threat: To make it possible to launch a retaliatory attack against home targets of the aggressor to cause much greater losses than gains.

However, because the Soviet Union enjoys superiority in conventional forces over the West in Europe, the so-called flexible reaction strategy is in fact based on the option of threatening to use tactical nuclear weapons to escalate the conflict. This means that once a war breaks out in Europe, it is very likely to lead to the use of nuclear weapons. This is the most worrying thing for both the opponent and the Western allies. Any measure that seems to make the U.S. nuclear protection commitment more credible may also increase the risk of the failure of deterrence strategy. This is also the

reason why the West European allies always hold a contradictory attitude toward the intermediate-range missile issue. The "double-zero option" is not only attractive to the United States and Western Europe in terms of reducing weapons, but also something that they cannot reject politically. However, the hardliners and the military in the United States hold that with the elimination of intermediate-range missiles, a "gap" may appear in the escalating nuclear deterrence structure, thus lowering the credibility of the nuclear deterrence policy. Therefore, they maintain that NATO should strengthen the cruise missiles deployed at sea or in the air to fill the "gap" created by the signing of the INF treaty. The "nimble" weapons mentioned above appear to be a more ideal supplementary means. They will not be subject to the limitations of any arms control treaty, and will be used as a "politically feasible" means of deterrence. The experts on the strategy committee perhaps thought that they might play a role in dealing with the possibility of a future "nuclear-free" central Europe.

Although the members of the strategy committee came from both parties, all of them are basically conservatives. (?Wohlfetter), one of the co-chairmen of the committee, is the main representative figure who has always advocated that "the United States should make preparations for fighting a nuclear war" since the 1950's. He is also a major adviser to the famous Gai Se [5556 3844] Committee. In 1957, this committee submitted a strategic research report to the Eisenhower administration, which played a big role in speeding up the development of strategic nuclear weapons in the United States.

It is now still hard to say how great an influence this report will produce. It was worked out against this background: Changes are occurring in the Soviet Union; bright prospects have appeared in the arms control and disarmament field; a certain new tendency has emerged in relations between the Western allies; and the prospects for the U.S. economy and the military budget are becoming dimmer. This year is election year in the United States, and defense and arms control will be a major topic in the campaign debates. All this will affect the attitude of the next administration toward the report.

Acting Premier Li Peng Supports UN Peace, Disarmament Efforts

*OW301441 Beijing XINHUA in English
1400 GMT 30 Mar 88*

[Text] Beijing, March 30 (XINHUA)—Chinese Acting Premier Li Peng said here today that China supports everything beneficial to world peace.

Li made this statement while meeting Peter Florin, chairman of the 42nd session of the United Nations General Assembly, and his party this afternoon.

Li reiterated this stand of China while talking about the U.N. General Assembly's third special session on disarmament scheduled for the near future.

China has taken note of the gratifying changes in the world situation during the 42nd U.N. General Assembly, Li said, adding that East-West relations have somewhat eased and the forces for peace are growing. "But the threat of war has not been eliminated," he noted.

Even if the United States and the Soviet Union could reach an agreement on cutting their offensive strategic nuclear weapons by 50 percent, they would still have enough nuclear weapons to destroy the world many times over, Li said.

And this is still threatening world peace, Li pointed out. "The people of the whole world need to make great efforts to obtain lasting peace," he added.

Li also praised the U.N. organizations and the 42nd U.N. General Assembly for their efforts to solve the "hot spot" problems in the world. He expressed his hope that they would play a still greater role in this respect.

The 42nd U.N. General Assembly has brought a positive influence to bear on the changes in the international situation and the process of the talks between the United States and the Soviet Union, Florin said.

World peace and international security are not the exclusive preserve of the two big powers, he stressed, adding, "international cooperation and mutual understanding should be strengthened to ensure world peace and international security."

Envoy to Geneva CD Urges Worldwide Ban on Chemical Weapons

*OW011225 Beijing XINHUA in English
1627 GMT 31 Mar 88*

[Text] Geneva, March 31 (XINHUA)—The Chinese ambassador to the 40-nation Disarmament Conference here today called for the early conclusion of an international treaty to ban and destroy chemical weapons with effective verification measures.

Fan Guoxiang said that countries capable of producing chemical weapons are growing in number, while the chemical arsenals of a few major military powers remain as large as ever.

Fan said that these facts, plus repeated violations of the Geneva protocol banning the use of chemical weapons made it all the more urgent and necessary to sign a stringent convention on chemical arms.

He said that China believes that such a convention should give priority to the destruction of existing chemical weapons and their production facilities, ensure that no chemical weapons will ever be produced, and provide for effective verification measures.

The Chinese official said it is necessary for the challenged state to accept effective international inspections

designed to determine whether there has been any violation of the proposed convention.

On the other hand, the challenging state should be prevented from abusing such a procedure to carry out activities irrelevant to the convention, Fan said.

The proposed convention, he said, should also contain provisions for assistance to states under chemical attack.

CZECHOSLOVAKIA

German, CSSR Parties Urge Tripartite CW Talks

LD052141 Prague CTK in English 1849 GMT 5 Apr 88

[Text] Prague April 5 (CTK)—The Communist Party of Czechoslovakia, the GDR's Socialist Unity Party of Germany, and the West German Social Democratic Party today urged the governments of their countries to immediately start talks on the removal of chemical weapons from and non-deployment of these weapons on their territories.

The three governments should call on states which have troops on the territories of the three countries to join this process, the parties said in a joint statement published today. They said they were concerned that no agreement had been reached on a general and complete ban on chemical weapons, and sought to activate the talks on these issues and carry on their joint initiative of June 1985.

They reaffirmed their joint initiative for a chemical weapon-free zone in Europe in an effort to achieve a world-wide ban on these weapons.

They proposed that the talks between the Governments of Czechoslovakia, the GDR and the FRG be based on their joint document of May 21, 1986, and said that a chemical-free zone in central Europe could be set up soon. The three countries should be prepared to enable inspections of their chemical production for peaceful purposes.

The parties urged all other European states to consider the possibilities of their involvement in this initiative. This regional step might help the solution of outstanding issues of a world-wide convention, they said and welcomed the intention of a unilateral withdrawal of U.S. chemical weapons from West German territory by 1992.

The parties stressed it would be desirable to set up and extend the zone immediately and said "binding statements" by Czechoslovakia, the GDR and West Germany that "they will neither produce nor obtain chemical weapons, nor permit other states to deploy and produce them on their territories and transport them across their territories, will be of decisive importance".

This should take place before 1992, the parties said.

GERMAN DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC

NEUES DEUTSCHLAND Commentary on Warsaw Pact Appeal to NATO

LD021024 East Berlin ADN International Service in German 0113 GMT 2 Apr 88

[Text] Berlin, 2 Apr (ADN)—In the appeal of the Warsaw Pact states to NATO and all CSCE participant states, a document is on hand which opens up real

opportunities of making progress by means of joint efforts on the path toward disarmament, security, and cooperation in all spheres. This is written by NEUES DEUTSCHLAND today in a commentary entitled "Our Appeal for Disarmament, Security, and Peace."

"Realistic, because what has already been achieved will be built upon. By this is meant the treaty between the USSR and the United States on the elimination of their intermediate- and shorter-range missiles. Realistic, because this historic step is based on the activities of many states, of the anti-war movements, and peaceloving forces on all continents. They all prove one thing: Nuclear disarmament and a world free of nuclear weapons and force are possible," the newspaper adds.

"It is now right to continue the process of disarmament, to safeguard and use what has been achieved. New agreements on the reduction of arms arsenals must be concluded. The member states of the Warsaw Pact do not stop with this call. They are submitting a specific program, a catalogue of priority tasks on the acquittal of which all countries should concentrate their efforts."

"How will NATO reply?", asks NEUES DEUTSCHLAND. "It would be good if those with responsibility, like us, assumed that the acquittal of these tasks means a contribution toward an improvement of the situation in Europe, toward a reduction of the danger of war, toward trust and multilateral cooperation. The NATO strategy of "Deterrence," the "Policy of Strength," and the threat of force are suitable neither for our times nor for the future; nor are the "Replacement" of that which is being done away with or a "Modernization" of nuclear weapons, which really means rearmament. The participant states of the Warsaw Pact will do everything within their powers, according to the conclusion of the appeal, for disarmament, security, and cooperation. In the West, and in the FRG in particular, this can be counted on: This is also the firm intention of the German Democratic Republic".

Text of German, CSSR Parties' Statement on CW

LD051002 East Berlin ADN International Service in German 0823 GMT 5 Apr 88

[Text] Berlin, 5 Apr (ADN)—In continuation of their joint initiative of 19 June 1985, for creating a chemical weapons-free zone in Europe and in view of the fact that a worldwide ban and the elimination of all chemical weapons have not yet been achieved, the SED Central Committee, the CPCZ Central Committee, and the party executive of the Social Democratic Party of Germany issue the following joint statement:

Negotiations on a worldwide ban on chemical weapons, binding in international terms, have been conducted for many years in the United Nations and the disarmament bodies in Geneva. Although notable progress has been achieved in this respect, considerable problems have appeared since the autumn of 1987. They are likely to

delay and even jeopardize the conclusion of the convention on the general and complete ban of all chemical weapons and their destruction.

Problems that have been raised in connection with the production of chemical binary weapons, insufficient monitoring, the dispute about militarily irrelevant quantities, and so-called safety stockpiles, even after the convention comes into force, are liable to block the success of the negotiations in Geneva.

In view of this situation, we support the appeal by our governments to the participants in the Geneva disarmament conference to continue their work in a constructive spirit and to remove all the obstacles.

In order to rid Europe of chemical weapons as quickly as possible and at the same time to promote a worldwide ban on chemical weapons, we affirm our joint initiative for the creation of a chemical weapons-free zone in Europe. Such a zone would be an integral component part and at the same time a source of experience for the realization of a global chemical weapons ban.

In order not to lose any more time, and in agreement with the security interests of the European peoples we suggest:

1. The GDR, CSSR, and FRG Governments should immediately begin negotiations on ridding or keeping their territories free of chemical weapons. They should appeal to those states that have deployed armed forces on their territory to participate in the negotiations.

The basis for the negotiations could be the document "Principles and Main Directions of Future Negotiations of the GDR, CSSR, and the FRG on the creation of a Chemical Weapons-Free Zone in Central Europe" of 21 May 1986, which would have to be supplemented by the treaty sections on the worldwide ban of chemical weapons as coordinated at the Geneva disarmament conference. This applies, among other things, to the supervision mechanism.

Progress was made on this issue in Geneva in 1986 and 1987, for instance, with regard to the precise announcement of places where stockpiles of chemical weapons are located and the venues of their destruction, and with regard to the implementation of the obligatory short-term inspections on application, without the right of refusal.

In this way, a chemical weapons-free zone could be created in central Europe in the near future, in which the deployment of all kinds of chemical weapons would be excluded in the future, as well. The three states should be prepared to make their chemical production for exclusively peaceful purposes available to open inspection.

2. On the way toward the worldwide destruction of chemical weapons, all other European states should examine the possibility of their participation in this initiative. They would thus acquire the right to inspect this zone.

This step of a regional character which has now been brought forward could help to clear up issues that remain open concerning a global convention by means of practical experiences. This step would thus be of significance far beyond the security of Europe, since it combines regional and global security.

In this connection, we welcome the intention to remove unilaterally the present U.S. chemical weapon stockpiles from the FRG by 1992.

It would be preferable to realize at once and expand the chemical weapons-free zone. We are of the opinion that the binding statement by the GDR, the CSSR, and the FRG that chemical weapons must neither be produced nor acquired, nor be deployed or produced by other states on their territory or transported through their territory, will be of crucial importance.

One should not wait with this until the year 1992.

HUNGARY

CSCE Envoy on Conventional Stability Mandate Progress in Vienna

LD010956 Budapest Domestic Service in Hungarian
2020 GMT 31 Mar 88

[“10 Minutes of Foreign Policy” program, presented by Istvan Kulcsar, with Hungarian Ambassador Andre Erdos—live or recorded]

[Excerpt] [Kulcsar] The fifth round of the European Security and Cooperation Follow-up Conference in Vienna has ended. The Hungarian delegation has arrived home for an Easter break and to report back. Have you done so already?

[Erdos] We have written most of the reports but still have one or two to write.

[Kulcsar] According to the evaluation of the Western press of the fifth round, a great step forward was made on the military issue, but there was hardly any progress on the humanitarian issues. Would you agree with this evaluation?

[Erdos] I would rather say that the fifth round concluded with modest results, but results nonetheless. I am emphasizing this because it has to be said that in the course of the fifth round we often found ourselves in difficult situations, the work often stagnated. Thus, it could be said that the results in fact exceeded my personal expectations. This means that in the military sphere we really made essential and important advances, while in the

humanitarian sphere there was some modest progress. Nonetheless, I would stress that since this humanitarian topic has a very important role at the Vienna meeting, we should not underestimate the significance of this modest progress.

[Kulcsar] Would you tell me in what areas you made progress in the military sphere?

[Erdos] As is well known, in the military sphere the 23 member states of the 2 military alliances have been holding consultations for some time in the interest of beginning negotiations on traditional disarmament in the future.

[Kulcsar] In other words, the mandate, the tasks, of this European disarmament conference is being worked out now in Vienna.

[Erdos] We have succeeded in setting down two chapters of the mandate. Considering that we set out another chapter in December last year, we now have three chapters of substance, and thus it can be said that in fact the major part of the mandate has now been put together. I hasten to add that the most important and most delicate issues are still to be tackled.

[Kulcsar] What are these?

[Erdos] I would mention first of all the question of the so-called dual-function weapons. Thus, in a wider sense, the question of the weapons, the type of weapons, which future negotiations will deal with. The question, in other words, concerns the weapons, the type of weapons, which the measures that we shall work out will apply to.

[Kulcsar] The dual-function weapons are, I believe, artillery and missiles that can be used with either traditional or nuclear warheads.

[Erdos] Yes, dual-function weapons include artillery, aircraft, and tanks as well. In other words, these are weapons that fit into either category. Our task is to discuss traditional weapons. Since these weapons are of a special type, in that they can be used in either a traditional or a nuclear role, it must be decided how this category should be reflected in the mandate.

[Kulcsar] Thus, basically, once you have solved this problem the disarmament conference can get under way.

[Erdos] I think that the negotiations aimed at creating a mandate for traditional disarmament are progressing well and in fact we could conclude them relatively quickly. I could even say that we could conclude the negotiations on this sooner than the end of the Vienna meeting itself.

[Kulcsar] On the other hand, obviously the conference could not get under way before the conclusion of the Vienna meeting, with a final document.

[Erdos] Consequently it can be expected that the negotiations on the mandate and the Vienna meeting itself will end at the same time, if only because this mandate will be included in the final document of the Vienna meeting.

[Kulcsar] I do not want to ask you when this is likely to happen because diplomats always evade that sort of question. Let us look at the question of what is slowing down or hindering the agreement on the humanitarian issues, and consequently the drafting of the final document as well.

[Erdos] Let me be a little undiplomatic and answer your question, since this is an issue that occupies everyone—both professionally and personally. How much longer do we have to sit there in Vienna? After all, we have been at work for a year and a half. I think that if the political will that we speak about so often—sometimes one feels this term has been degraded into a mere slogan, but it is not so—if this political will is given, and if the delegations in Vienna display the openness and willingness to compromise that we need so greatly, then as far as the amount of work is concerned, I find it conceivable that we could conclude the Vienna meeting by the middle of the year.

[Kulcsar] What stage have you reached with this document?

[Erdos] What one could say is that as regards the bulk of the text, this final document has been put into words, even if in different forms. By this I mean that in some cases we have made notes on the text, in other cases we determined the text. These have a different status. However, in totality, a large proportion of the texts are available. At the same time I again hasten to add that this does not mean that we have solved all the complex and contentious issues. I think that these, the most complex and most delicate issues, will be left to the last stage—they will be settled in the end-game, and this is when the full picture will emerge on the final document.

[Kulcsar] What are the humanitarian issues that are delaying the coinciding of the texts in substance?

[Erdos] Seeing that what is involved is a joint effort by 35 countries, reaching a consensus, an agreement, is not an easy task. We have succeeded in approving a so-called package that contains paragraphs from all the four subsections of the third basket.

IZVESTIYA Profiles New ACDA Director Burns
52001057 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian
27 Mar 88 p 5

[Unattributed item headlined: "Who Is Who: William Burns"]

[Text] William Burns has become the new director of the U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency [ACDA]. He participated directly in the preparation of the Soviet-American INF Treaty.

W. Burns, a career military man, holds the rank of major general. He was born in 1932, in Scranton, Pennsylvania. He graduated from La Salle College in Philadelphia and from Princeton University. He received a master's degree in international studies.

For a long time W. Burns held command assignments in the U.S. Army and in military educational institutions. After 1982, Burns was a member of the American delegation to the Geneva negotiations. He participated in the preparation of the agreement on the liquidation of medium- and short-range missiles. More recently he was U.S. deputy assistant secretary of state for political-military affairs.

As the American press has pointed out, W. Burns has great practical experience in conducting negotiations on disarmament. He was considered the main candidate for the post of ACDA director after the resignation in December of former agency director K. Adelman. The newspaper DEFENSE NEWS describes him as a "specialist devoted to his specialty," distinguished by a pragmatic approach to questions of disarmament. W. Burns, the newspaper reports, has always stood aside from arguments on political questions.

UD/330

Warsaw Pact Foreign Ministers Committee Meets
29-30 March

Text of Communique
PM301551 Moscow PRAVDA in Russian
31 Mar 88 First Edition p 5

[Unattributed item: "Communiqué of the Warsaw Pact Foreign Ministers' Session"]

[Text] A routine session of the Foreign Ministers' Committee of the Warsaw Treaty on Friendship, Cooperation, and Mutual Assistance was held in Sofia 29-30 March 1988.

Taking part in the session were: Bulgarian Foreign Minister P. Mladenov; Hungarian Foreign Minister P. Varkonyi; GDR Foreign Minister O. Fischer; Polish

Foreign Minister M. Orzechowski; Romanian Foreign Minister I. Totu; USSR Foreign Minister E.A. Shevardnadze; and Czechoslovak Foreign Minister B. Chnoupek.

1. The session examined a wide range of international—above all, European—problems, and discussed priority tasks in the further development and strengthening of positive trends in the international situation. Stating that the situation in Europe and the world as a whole remains relatively complex and contradictory, the ministers stressed the urgent need to move the disarmament process forward and to create a nuclear-free, nonviolent world. It is important that all states refrain from any actions that might complicate this process. We must not allow disarmament in one area to be accompanied by the simultaneous launch of an arms race in other areas.

The session adopted an appeal to the NATO states and all the CSCE countries.

2. The session participants advocated the speediest conclusion of the ratification process for the treaty concluded between the USSR and the United States on the elimination of their intermediate- and shorter-range missiles, which, it is generally recognized, is of historic importance.

They view the treaty on intermediate- and shorter-range missiles as a first step which should be followed by new agreements aimed at reducing strategic offensive weapons, preventing an arms race in space, ensuring the complete and universal prohibition of nuclear tests, eliminating nuclear, chemical, and other types of mass destruction weaponry, reducing armed forces and conventional arms in Europe, cutting military spending, and resolving other security and disarmament issues.

The ministers expressed the conviction that the conclusion of an agreement between the USSR and the United States to halve their strategic offensive weapons while observing the ABM Treaty in the form in which it was signed in 1972 and not withdrawing from that treaty for an agreed period would be a fundamental measure in the disarmament sphere. USSR Foreign Minister E.A. Shevardnadze briefed the participants on the progress of the Soviet-U.S. talks in Geneva on nuclear and space arms and on other contacts with U.S. representatives on this subject. There was total support for the Soviet side's position.

The session participants stressed the need to abandon any intention to "compensate" in any way whatsoever for the nuclear arms due to be scrapped under the treaty on intermediate- and shorter-range missiles.

The Soviet Union's withdrawal from the GDR and the CSSR—by agreement with them—of Soviet OTR-22 missiles even before the treaty on intermediate- and

shorter-range missiles came into force was seen by the countries represented at the session as a manifestation of goodwill in the nuclear disarmament process.

3. The ministers had an in-depth exchange of opinions on questions of disarmament, the strengthening of security, confidence-building, and the development of mutually advantageous cooperation in Europe, and expressed their states' readiness to expand constructive dialogues with other countries to that end.

Session participants stressed that the inviolability of the postwar borders on the continent, respect for the present-day territorial-political realities, the sovereignty and territorial integrity of states, and strict observance of the universally recognized principles and standards of international law are a precondition for the maintenance of lasting peace and security in Europe. Any attempts to question these realities and their unshakeable nature will continue to be most resolutely repulsed. They pointed out here that the activity of revanchist forces and the encouragement of revanchism wherever it may be runs counter to the interest of detente and security, the treaties and agreements signed in the seventies, and the Helsinki Final Act.

4. The session participants expressed the firm intention of their countries to seek substantial cuts in armed forces and conventional arms in Europe ranging from the Atlantic to the Urals and the earliest start to relevant talks. If the danger posed by a surprise attack is to be avoided it is essential to pay special attention to cutting those kinds of armaments which form the basis of armed forces' offensive might, including tactical nuclear weapons. The historically formed asymmetries and imbalances in the conventional weapons sphere in Europe would be removed on a mutual basis by reductions on the part of the side which has superiority in a particular kind of armaments. This would meet the principles of equal and identical security of the sides and the interests of all European countries. All steps would be taken on the basis of the exchange of necessary data under an effective system of verification and monitoring.

Armed forces, conventional arms, and military equipment, including dual-purpose systems without their nuclear component, would be the subject of talks. The nuclear component of dual-purpose systems itself would be the subject of separate talks. Such talks should not be long delayed. The Warsaw Pact states remain ready to hold them simultaneously with talks on conventional arms and confirm their declared aim of completely eliminating tactical nuclear weapons in Europe.

5. Session participants analyzed the results of the work carried out at the Vienna meeting and noted that the forum has come very close to the crucial point of adopting a political decision which would further strengthen security and cooperation in Europe.

The Warsaw Pact states expressed their resolve to seek to crown the Vienna meeting with the kind of accords which would, based on all the principles and provisions of the Helsinki Final Act, put all spheres of the all-European process on a qualitatively new level, develop the dynamics of real disarmament on the continent, enable even more substantial and effective confidence- and security-building measures to be taken, provide a powerful impetus to deepening economic, scientific, and technical cooperation and collaboration in the sphere of culture and in all other humanitarian aspects, and create mutual understanding and respect.

The countries represented at the session advocate intensifying the work of the Vienna meeting in all areas. For their part they are ready to help in every possible way to draft a meaningful and balanced final document there.

The proposal to complete the Vienna meeting at the level of CSCE foreign ministers was confirmed. This would enable the ministers to hold an exchange of opinions on questions of the further deepening of the all-European process and begin talks at the forums on confidence- and security-building measures and on the reduction of armed forces and conventional arms in Europe.

The interests of all the European peoples would be served by the creation of an indivisible Europe of peace and cooperation, an "all-European home" in which an atmosphere of good-neighborliness and trust would be established.

Confirming the position of their states regarding the need to overcome the division of Europe into opposing military blocs, the ministers again advocated the simultaneous disbandment of the North Atlantic alliance and the Warsaw Pact with the elimination of their military organizations as the first step.

6. The ministers noted that improvements in the sphere of nuclear disarmament are creating more favorable preconditions for the adoption at a regional level in Europe of measures aimed at reducing military confrontation and strengthening trust and security. In this connection they confirmed the great importance of implementing the proposals put forward by their states either jointly or individually.

The states represented at the session expressed full support for and stressed their readiness to help to implement the following:

the Bulgarian and Romanian proposals on the creation in the Balkans of a nuclear- and chemical-weapons free zone and on the development of relations of good-neighborliness and cooperation among the countries of that region;

the GDR and CSSR proposals on the creation of a nuclear-free corridor and a chemical weapons-free zone in Central Europe;

the Polish plan on the reduction of armaments and the enhancement of trust in Central Europe, which would be of great significance for reducing the danger of a surprise attack and developing the process of disarmament and strengthening trust on the continent;

and the CSSR's comprehensive new initiative on the creation along the line of contact between the two alliances of a zone of trust, cooperation, and good-neighborly relations aimed at the further development of the all-European process.

The ministers welcomed the joint proposal put forward in Hungary, Finland, and Italy containing an appeal to states not possessing nuclear weapons to step up their efforts in the interests of promoting the cause of disarmament in Europe.

7. The ministers believe the efforts aimed at strengthening stability in Europe must be augmented by resolute measures to reduce military activeness in the seas and oceans around the continent. They confirmed their support for the USSR's proposals on radical reducing military confrontation in northern Europe and the Arctic as a whole, on transforming that region into a zone of peace and cooperation, and on holding the necessary talks, consultations, and meetings among interested states for that purpose.

Emphasis was also placed on the need to transform the Mediterranean into a zone of stable peace, security, and cooperation. The session participants positively rated the proposals aimed at achieving this and advocated the consistent and complete implementation of the sections of the Helsinki Final Act and the Madrid Final Document concerning security and cooperation in the Mediterranean. The ministers welcomed the USSR's continuing readiness to withdraw its navy, including nuclear-weapon carrying ships, from the Mediterranean—on a reciprocal basis with the United States—and its new initiatives aimed at limiting the potential of the naval forces stationed there, coordinating confidence measures regarding this region, and ensuring the safety of shipping lanes.

8. The states represented at the session positively assess the results of the Belgrade meeting of Balkan states' foreign ministers as a contribution to the easing of tension and the creation of an atmosphere of good-neighborliness and mutual understanding in the Balkans. They support the readiness expressed at the meeting to continue and deepen the bilateral and multilateral dialogue at all levels, including summit level, for the purpose of strengthening peace, mutual understanding, security, and cooperation in this region.

9. The participants in the session attach particular importance to the Third UN General Assembly Special Session on Disarmament, the most representative world forum in this sphere, and proceed from the premise that its work will affirm the concept of security through

disarmament and the other stipulations formulated in the final document of the First Special Session on Disarmament. They expect that the forthcoming special session will, on the basis of detailed analysis of the most important aspects of the arms race and disarmament talks, map out the main avenues for disarmament and strengthening of security, give a positive impetus to all relevant bilateral and multilateral talks, and adopt a decision on improving the negotiating and consultative mechanisms in this sphere and above all on boosting the efficiency of the Geneva Disarmament Conference. The ministers advocate that the session's final document should be as meaningful and as specific as possible.

10. The ministers positively assessed the document, adopted by the 42d UN General Assembly Session, on the creation of an all-embracing system of international peace and security, which lays foundations for the development and deepening of international dialogue in this sphere. They advocated the continuation of consultations with all interested states on different aspects of the shaping of such a system, and emphasized the great importance of solving specific military-political, economic, ecological, and humanitarian questions for this purpose.

11. The states represented at the session confirmed the need for all countries to strictly respect the principles of national independence and sovereignty, the nonuse or threat of force, inviolability of borders and territorial integrity, peaceful solution of disputes, noninterference in internal affairs, equality, and the other principles and objectives of the UN Charter, the Helsinki Final Act, and other norms of international relations.

12. The session participants exchanged opinions on the seats of tension and conflicts existing in the world. They emphasized the need for their earliest possible political settlement and affirmed the determination of their states to actively contribute to this.

The ministers affirmed their countries' stance on the question of achieving a fair and all-embracing settlement and ensuring lasting peace in the Near East. They deem it extremely necessary to convene for this purpose an international conference under UN auspices with equal participation by all interested sides including the PLO and the permanent members of the Security Council, and advocate that preparations for it be speeded up by using, among other things, the potential of the UN Security Council. The ministers condemned the Israeli authorities' actions on the West Bank of the Jordan and the Gaza Strip.

The ministers expressed serious concern in connection with the current escalation of the Iran-Iraq conflict. They spoke in favor of building up international efforts with a view to the earliest possible implementation of UN Security Council Resolution No 598. They noted the important role played by the United Nations and its secretary general for the settlement of this conflict.

An exchange of opinions took place in connection with the Afghan-Pakistani talks in Geneva. Support was expressed for the course of achieving national reconciliation in Afghanistan and the earliest possible political settlement of the situation on the basis of a halt to all interference in this country's internal affairs and respect for its independence and sovereignty. The ministers advocate the earliest-possible conclusion of the Afghan-Pakistani talks and the signing of documents constituting a political settlement of the situation around Afghanistan, which will make it possible to embark on the withdrawal of Soviet troops. It was noted that the solution of internal Afghan problems is a matter only for the Afghans themselves.

The ministers advocated a fair political settlement of the Cyprus problem on the basis of respect for the independence, unity, territorial integrity, and nonalignment policy of the Republic of Cyprus.

13. The session participants examined questions of cooperation among the allied countries in the foreign policy sphere and the state of these countries' collaboration in the world arena, and expressed their intention to continue to deepen and develop it.

The session proceeded in an atmosphere of friendship and mutual understanding. The next session will be held in Budapest.

'Appeal' to NATO, CSCE Countries

PM301547 Moscow PRAVDA in Russian
31 Mar 88 First Edition p 5

[“Appeal to the NATO Member States and All Countries Participating in the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe”—PRAVDA headline]

[Text] The signing of the treaty between the USSR and the United States on the elimination of intermediate- and shorter-range missiles was an event of historic significance in international life and a victory for a realistic policy. Its attainment was promoted by the actions of many states and the actions of antiwar movement and peace-loving forces on all continents. The treaty confirms the possibility of nuclear disarmament and the creation of a nuclear-free and nonviolent world.

The treaty is only a beginning. The main thing today is, while preserving and utilizing everything positive that made it possible to conclude the treaty, consistently to increase the efforts of each and every state with the aim of making the disarmament process continuous and irreversible and concluding new agreements aimed at further reducing the stockpiled arsenals of weapons and leading to the establishment of military equilibrium on an ever lower level and the elimination of the danger of war on the European continent and throughout the world.

A real opportunity is opening up before Europe—to ensure lasting security through a substantial reduction in armed forces and conventional arms, the elimination on both sides of the potential for a surprise attack, and the continent's total liberation from nuclear and other types of weapons of mass destruction.

Proceeding on this basis, the Warsaw Pact states consider it necessary for the efforts of all countries to be concentrated on resolving the following priority tasks:

—Ensuring the entry into force of the USSR-U.S. Treaty on the Elimination of Intermediate- and Shorter-Range Missiles and its implementation.

—The conclusion in the first half of 1988 of a USSR-U.S. treaty on a 50-percent reduction in strategic offensive arms and an agreement on strict compliance with the ABM Treaty in the form in which it was signed in 1972, and on nonwithdrawal from that treaty for an agreed term.

—A general and complete ban on nuclear weapons tests and the acceleration of progress toward this goal through the elaboration at Soviet-U.S. talks on a nuclear test ban of an accord on additional verification measures in the interests of the speedy ratification of the 1974 and 1976 USSR-U.S. treaties and the attainment of an agreement on a further reduction in the capacity and number of nuclear explosions.

—The completion in 1988 of the drafting of a convention on banning chemical weapons and eliminating stockpiles. It should make provision for reliable monitoring and verification procedures, including compulsory inspections on request without the right of refusal. The stepping up of openness and the creation of an atmosphere of trust would be promoted by holding in the near future a multilateral exchange of relevant data in connection with the drafting of the convention.

—The speediest completion at the 23d consultations within the framework of the Vienna meeting of CSCE states of work to agree on a mandate for talks on reducing armed forces and conventional arms in Europe from the Atlantic to the Urals and the commencement of such talks in 1988. These aims would be promoted by holding as soon as possible an exchange of data on the armed forces and conventional arms of the Warsaw Pact countries and NATO in Europe. Advocating a substantial reduction in armed forces and conventional arms with a corresponding reduction in military expenditure, the Warsaw Pact states are prepared in the course of these talks to uncover and eliminate on a reciprocal basis the existing asymmetries and imbalances both on an all-European scale and for individual regions.

—The commencement of separate talks on the reduction of tactical nuclear weapons in Europe, including nuclear components of dual-purpose systems, and the subsequent elimination of such weapons.

—The implementation by the Warsaw Pact states and NATO of a comparison of military doctrines, taking military-technical aspects into account, with a view to giving the military doctrines and concepts of the two military alliances and their participants a strictly defensive thrust.

—The development and expansion at the Conference on Confidence and Security Building Measures and Disarmament in Europe of the confidence-building measures adopted during the first stage of its work, in parallel with the elaboration of a new generation of confidence- and security-building measures, including the limitation of the number and scale of military exercises and the extension of confidence-building measures to the activity of air and naval forces.

—The creation of zones free from nuclear and chemical weapons in the Balkans and in Central and Northern Europe, arms cuts and confidence building in Central Europe, the creation of a nuclear-free corridor and zone of trust and a reduced level of armaments along the line of contact between the Warsaw Pact and NATO, the commencement of the process of limiting military activity and lowering the level of military confrontation in Northern and Southern Europe, and the transformation of the Mediterranean into a zone of peace and cooperation.

—The commencement of talks attended by the major naval powers, particularly states possessing nuclear weapons, and also other interested states on limiting and prohibiting naval activity in agreed areas, limiting and reducing naval armaments, and extending confidence-building measures to seas and oceans to safeguard security and freedom of navigation.

—The declaration of a moratorium for 1-2 years on increasing military expenditure by the Warsaw Pact and NATO states with a view to its further effective reduction.

—The activation of practical and purposeful work at the Geneva Disarmament Conference to adopt effective measures leading to the complete and general prohibition of nuclear weapon tests, nuclear disarmament, and the prevention of an arms race in space, in such a way that bilateral and multilateral talks on these problems complement one another and pursue a common aim.

To achieve and successfully implement accords in all these spheres, particular significance would attach to ensuring greater glasnost and predictability in the military sphere, exchanging the requisite information, and creating a rigorous and effective system for monitoring and verifying the pledges adopted by the sides.

The solution of the aforementioned tasks will contribute to the further improvement of the situation in Europe and will lead to a considerable reduction of the military threat, stronger confidence, and the development of multifaceted cooperation on the continent.

The foreign ministers of the Warsaw Pact states confirm their states' proposals on eliminating military bases and withdrawing foreign forces from other countries' territories and note that their implementation would be a substantial contribution to strengthening stability and security in Europe and in the world.

There is a growing belief in the world that nuclear war must never be unleashed and can have no victors, that it is necessary to prevent any war, either nuclear or conventional, and that the creation of a safe world demands the demonstration of new thinking and a new approach to questions of war and peace, and presupposes the complete elimination of nuclear weapons and the abandonment of the concepts of "nuclear deterrence" and the policy of force and threat of force in interstate relations.

The arms eliminated in the process of disarmament and cuts must not be replaced by others and barriers must be placed in the way of any new avenues of the arms race. The implementation of the ideas of "compensation" and the improvement and development of new systems, be they nuclear, chemical, or conventional, would conflict with the fundamental interests of the peoples of Europe who want the continent to be rid of the weapons that have accumulated there.

The Warsaw Pact states urgently appeal to the NATO countries and to all European states to take advantage of the historic opportunity and continue through joint efforts to move along the path of disarmament and the strengthening of security and cooperation in all areas. They, for their part, will do everything incumbent on them to that end.

FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF GERMANY

Gorbachev Said To Favor 'Dominance of Defense' Proposal by Scientists
18260004a Munich SUEDDEUTSCHE ZEITUNG in German 5 Feb 88 p 11

[Article by Kurt Kister, member of the SUEDDEUTSCHE ZEITUNG editorial staff: "Dominance of the Defensive" a New Proposal for Conventional Arms Control; a Position Paper by Scientists Meets With Gorbachev's Favor"]

[Text] Albrecht von Mueller, who works for the Max Planck Institute in Starnberg on questions of security policy, a short time ago received unusual mail. Last year Mueller and 3 other scientists—Franz von Hippel (United States), Anders Boserup (Denmark), Robert Neild (Great Britain)—had received a suggestion from Moscow to draw up a position paper on conventional arms control. One of the initiators of this suggestion was Georgiy Arbatov, Western expert of the Kremlin and close adviser of party chief Mikhail Gorbachev. After some time had passed following the drafting of the paper, Mueller was informed by the Soviet embassy in Bonn that it had received an answer from Moscow. The confidential letter, several pages long, states, i.a., that the elaboration of the scientists was not only read with interest but also the approach on the whole was approved. The letter is signed by no less a person than Mikhail Gorbachev himself.

Recently Mueller, who holds a doctorate in philosophy and is the director of the Max Planck Society's research program on "Stability-oriented Security and Defense Policy," has taken a further step. Together with the renowned Polish defense expert Andrzej Karkoszka of the "Warsaw Institute for International Policy," Mueller formulated a proposal for conventional arms control. This East-West paper is based on the text, which according to Gorbachev, is "very close" to the Kremlin's concepts. Mueller is encouraged not only by Moscow's reaction but also by the fact that it was possible to develop the proposals jointly with a leading planner from an important Warsaw Pact country.

In their paper the authors divide the initial position for conventional arms control into two points. On the one hand, they said, the detente of the 1970's was unable to prevent the mutual military threat from growing. On the other hand, there is the danger that both alliance systems, despite mutual declarations, in the future, too, could get caught in a "trap" as happened in the Vienna MBFR talks. In Vienna NATO and the Warsaw Pact have been arguing for almost 15 years about who has how many troops stationed where. The MBFR negotiations have, in fact, come to a standstill over this dispute on data.

In Mueller's and Karkoszka's opinion, the aim of future negotiations is to achieve "conventional stability" by conventional arms control. To this end the capability for defense of both sides must be clearly superior to the offensive capability of the other side. If it is the desire to create such a "mutual defense superiority" armed forces must be so structured that they no longer appear conducive to success to the aggressor. What is involved is the elimination of the advantages arising from a rapid thrust, surprise, and local superiority. Whoever wants to avail himself of such advantages must have an army with strong armored forces and can conduct rapid deep strikes on the ground and from the air against the enemy's rear area.

At present the Warsaw Pact armies are structured in precisely that way; moreover they are trained according to a doctrine which declares offense as a form of defense. In the West there is neither such a doctrine nor do the ground forces possess the capability for comprehensive attack. It is true, NATO's FOFA concept, the attack against the second echelon of the Warsaw Pact, provides for the deep strike from the air in the rear of the aggressor. The Brussels NATO headquarters justifies the FOFA concept by the necessity to prevent the further influx of units to the front on account of the sheer numerical Warsaw Pact superiority.

For some time the East has actually admitted numerical superiority, for example, as regards battle tanks. The paper of the 2 scientists also takes up this point. "In view of the existing imbalance," it is stated there, "straight reductions with otherwise identical structures would make the situation even worse for the outnumbered side." In plain English, because of its large number of tanks the Warsaw Pact could afford to reduce it by a certain percentage of tanks without losing force of penetration. On the other hand, NATO, weaker in this area, would noticeably lose defense capability by the removal of the same percentage. Therefore, again according to the argumentation in the paper, reductions must be made asymmetrically. Whoever has more must also reduce more (Moscow was not interested in this approach as late as Vienna). But, they said, this alone does not yet guarantee stability since even a smaller aggressor army is a threat. For Mueller and Karkoszka the solution lies, on the one hand, in identical upper force limits by asymmetrical reductions, but, on the other hand, in a change of the structures and doctrines in the direction of a "dominance of the defensive." The NATO policy on conventional arms control also meets with criticism from the scientists. In their opinion the Western alliance proposes upper limits which are little below the present strength of the NATO forces. "This changes neither the armed forces structures," says Albrecht von Mueller, "nor takes into account the destabilizing factor of the deep strike capability. It is probably not even negotiable because the Warsaw Pact would have to reduce arms by half in some branches of service while NATO would have to make only cosmetic corrections."

The Starnberg proposal, which is also based on many years of work of the International Pugwash Movement (a now 30-year-old organization of scientists from all countries) counters the Western alliance proposal with another approach: Selected weapons systems are to be reduced which provide advantages predominantly in case of an attack or in case of a deep strike. For this purpose the upper limit to strive for should be about half of the present NATO strength. Concrete examples: Each side is to be stationed per 10,000 square kilometers (this is to make concentrations for an attack considerably more difficult). Similar reductions are proposed for heavy artillery and rocket launchers; in the case of fighter-bombers and combat helicopters the maximum is to be 500 each. To make rapid advances impossible, munitions depots are to be established at least 150 km from the border. Furthermore the demand is made that both sides renounce mobile pontoon bridges of any kind (such equipment is urgently needed for a rapid advance of mechanized forces). These proposals, the authors acknowledge, require "drastic changes": "But they are necessary to establish conventional stability, i.e. to make the strategic attack unattractive, powerless and self-destructive." But this concept, too, would assume deep cuts; in the case of the NATO branches of service, about half, in the case of the Warsaw Pact, about four-fifths of the present strength.

The Polish scientist and the German scientist moreover do not advocate denuclearization. "At present" they consider unavoidable the retention of nuclear weapons in Europe as a "factor of unpredictability." Here the authors propose an upper limit of 500 warheads each (NATO now stores 4,200 such warheads in Europe). A maximum of 100 of them should be mounted on missiles with a maximum range of 500 km. This is interesting

because the Polish expert thus concedes to NATO the right of modernizing its short-range missiles, which, after the INF agreement, are now so controversial in the West. Mueller and Karkoszka consider permissible even modernizations in the conventional field, which serve defense. There are especially no restrictions whatsoever for antitank weapons, barrier technologies, air defense, etc.

By the way, these figures were also available to the Soviet party chief. However, in his letter to Mueller, Gorbachev does not go into that matter. But he writes: "We see the way to ensure an adequate military strength according to criteria of reason in that the states should not possess any armed forces which go beyond what is necessary for an effective defense." In the second sentence Gorbachev then continues—and this is new for the Soviet position: "Armed forces should also be so structured that they possess all the means necessary to repulse a possible attack, but at the same time cannot be used for the development of offensive missions." Thus the Kremlin chief draws closer to the kind of position advocated in the FRG for some time by the SPD as "structural inability to attack." Mueller had collaborated early on this concept, even before it was accepted by the Social Democrats, to whom Mueller does not belong. By the way, an oddity: The SPD regional executive in Southern Bavaria headed by Peter Glotz has adopted the arms control position of Mueller and his Polish colleague in a proposal for the regional party congress on 20 February. This will probably be the first proposal of this body which has the express support, although only in principle, of a Soviet state and party chief....

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